Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals by Cheng, Faye
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School
5-2012
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals
Faye Cheng
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory
Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/89
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Cheng, Faye, "Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals" (2012). Wharton Research Scholars. 89.
http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/89
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals
Abstract
The consistently high rate of merger failure is a concern given the increasing number and magnitude of
mergers that shape today’s industries. Cultural integration has been cited as a main but oftenThe consistently
high rate of merger failure is a concern given the increasing number and magnitude of mergers that shape
today’s industries. Cultural integration has been cited as a main but often neglected reason for the prevalence
of these failures, and the choice in leadership succession is a particularly high profile component of such
cultural integration. This paper seeks to examine the relationship beween leadership succession and long-term
financial success specifically in mergers of equals. Building upon previous studies of mergers of equals and
employing public information and reported financial data in multivariate statistical analyses, this study
examines what characteristics of leadership succession, if any, are significantly correlated with long-term
financial success of the merged company and in what way. Examining the implications of leadership
succession in an extreme form of mergers, a merger of equals, can yield important findings to better
understand what allows some mergers to succeed while others fail. neglected reason for the prevalence of
these failures, and the choice in leadership succession is a particularly high profile component of such cultural
integration. This paper seeks to examine the relationship beween leadership succession and long-term
financial success specifically in mergers of equals. Building upon previous studies of mergers of equals and
employing public information and reported financial data in multivariate statistical analyses, this study
examines what characteristics of leadership succession, if any, are significantly correlated with long-term
financial success of the merged company and in what way. Examining the implications of leadership
succession in an extreme form of mergers, a merger of equals, can yield important findings to better
understand what allows some mergers to succeed while others fail.
Keywords
merger of equals, leadership succession, co-CEO, succession plan, hostile
Disciplines
Business | Corporate Finance | Organizational Behavior and Theory
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/89
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 1 	  
 
 
Wharton Research Scholars  
 
Spring 2012 
 
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals 
 
 
Faye Cheng 
 
Advisors: Emilie Feldman, Sigal Barsade 
 
Department of Management at the Wharton School 
 
University of Pennsylvania  
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The consistently high rate of merger failure is a concern given the increasing number and 
magnitude of mergers that shape today’s industries.  Cultural integration has been cited as a main 
but often neglected reason for the prevalence of these failures, and the choice in leadership 
succession is a particularly high profile component of such cultural integration.  This paper seeks 
to examine the relationship beween leadership succession and long-term financial success 
specifically in mergers of equals.  Building upon previous studies of mergers of equals and 
employing public information and reported financial data in multivariate statistical analyses, this 
study examines what characteristics of leadership succession, if any, are significantly correlated 
with long-term financial success of the merged company and in what way.  Examining the 
implications of leadership succession in an extreme form of mergers, a merger of equals, can 
yield important findings to better understand what allows some mergers to succeed while others 
fail. 
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I. Introduction 
In the last four decades, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have grown from a relatively 
little used form of corporate strategy into a preferred form of corporate development for many 
companies.  For instance, in 2004, 30,000 acquisitions were completed at an aggregate value of 
$1900 B (Heijltjes). For reference, this is just less than one-fifth the United States GDP in the 
same year.  For many firms, M&As are a way to grow and develop their business lines without 
having to engage in costly, time-consuming, and unpredictable research and development and 
organic growth.  Mergers can take on two general forms: horizontal mergers, in which 
companies combine with related companies in order to achieve economies of scale, and vertical 
mergers, in which companies of unrelated businesses combine to create economies of scope.  
Despite their continually growing popularity, M&As have seen a consistently high failure 
rate.  A study conducted by John Kitching in 1974 suggests a 46-50% failure rate of M&As, self-
reported by firm executives.  A 1994 study showed little progress two decades later, reporting a 
44-45% failure rate using the same methodology as the 1974 study (Cartwright).  A 2005 
McKinsey study cited that 70% of mergers fail to achieve expected revenue synergies and 40% 
do not reach their cost synergy expectations (Allred). 
If M&As are so popular, why do they have such high failure rates? Varying sources 
propose a variety of reasons, including unforeseeable financial and market factors (Heijltjes), but 
a common conclusion identifies the implementation and integration process of the M&A as a 
main culprit.  In their 2005 article for The Academy of Management Executive, Brent Allred and 
colleagues even liken the cultural integration of two firms to the formation of stepfamilies and 
the challenges associated with this process: Biological Discrimination, Incomplete 
Institutionalization, and Deficit-Comparison (Allred).  Specifically, recent M&A research shows 
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that the cultural integration of the two firms and, as a subset of this, the retention and integration 
of top management teams are crucial components of ensuring a successful M&A transaction 
(Harding).   
The issue of retaining and integrating members of top management teams seems to be a 
salient factor, considering that various studies have confirmed a 70-75% departure rate of 
executives within five years of a merger (Cartwright, Siehl).  This phenomenon can be explained 
by a variety of reasons: perhaps the merger was meant as a fresh start for the two companies 
involved, and the departure of key executives was symbolic of this change.  Or, more commonly 
suggested, professional and personal clashes between the members of the merging executive 
teams leads, more often than not, to hostile departures.   
If the departure rate of executives post-merger is so high, does this make the initial 
decision of leadership succession particularly important in determining the success of the merged 
company?  M&A literature hosts two schools of thought on this issue: Organizational Ecology 
proponents suggest that company performance is not significantly linked to leadership factors.  
In contrast, Impact of Strategic Choice supporters contend that the choice in leader does have 
significant impact on company performance (Heijltjes).   
For most M&As, the choice of leader is not in doubt, as typical M&As have a clear 
acquiring firm and target firm.  In such cases, the top executive of the acquiring firm simply 
retains this position in the merged firm.  However, for a small segment of mergers denoted 
Mergers of Equals (MOEs), this distinction is not so easy. 
According to Julie Wulf, a professor at Harvard Business School, in her 2001 paper “Do 
CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence From ‘Mergers of Equals,’” mergers of 
equals are “friendly mergers generally characterized by extensive pre-merger negotiations 
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between two firms closer in size that result in approximately equal board representation in the 
merged firm” (Wulf).  Additionally, she identifies that, from the period 1991-1999, while MOEs 
only accounted for 2% of the number of M&A transactions, they accounted for 10% of the value 
of these transactions, suggesting that, despite their relative rarity, these types of mergers engage 
significant company value.  More generally, MOEs have the following characteristics: 
 
• There is no explicitly designated acquiring or target firm 
• Both companies are represented equally on the Board of Directors of the merged 
company 
• Shareholders from each of the original companies retain ownership in the merged entity 
• There is no explicit premium paid to either side as a result of the merger 
 
As suggested by the name, many MOEs are mergers between companies that are relatively 
similar in size prior to the merger; however, MOEs as of yet remain a relatively little-researched 
phenomenon, and so there do not exist generally accepted numerical criteria for designating a 
merger as an MOE. 
 
Some better-known MOEs in recent decades include: 
• Travelers Group and Citicorp, forming Citigroup (1998) 
• Bell Atlantic and GTE, forming Verizon Communications (2000) 
• Martin Marietta and Lockheed Corporations, forming Lockheed Martin (1995) 
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There are a number of reasons why companies might choose to engage specifically in an 
MOE as opposed to a typical M&A transaction, in which there is a clear target and acquiring 
company.  First of all, MOEs present a sense of equality between the two merging companies in 
a way that suggests that both companies will benefit from the merger.  Additionally, MOEs are a 
better way of preserving employee morale, as neither company is identified as being the 
“acquired” or lesser company.  Because of these reasons, some view MOEs as facilitating the 
post-merger integration process by promoting a “cooperative” rather than “competitive” 
environment between the merging parties.  In fact, according to Israel Drori and colleagues in 
their paper “Cultural Clashes in a ‘Merger of Equals’: The Case of High-Tech Start-ups” (2011), 
“arguments about equality in mergers have indicated that this type of phenomenon is merely a 
symbolic gesture aimed at defusing potential conflicts and smoothing cultural differences” (Drori 
et. al.). 
 The nature of MOEs, then, presents a particularly interesting and extreme case study of 
leadership succession in mergers.  Because the two merging companies are, for all intents and 
purposes, “equal,” the process of choosing and implementing leadership succession is much 
more complex than a typical merger.  This paper will examine the impact of leadership 
succession in MOEs, specifically examining whether particular characteristics of leadership 
succession in these types of mergers are significantly correlated with ultimate financial success. 
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II. Methodology 
Identifying the MOEs 
 Data for this study was based off Wulf’s 2001 study.  In her study, Wulf identifies all 
MOEs from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999.  Her criteria in identifying general 
acquisitions are as follows: 
 
1. Both firms are publicly traded and listed on the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database 
2. The merger is not classified as a share repurchase, a self-tender, or a sale of minority 
interest 
3. The type of merger is classified as either a stock swap or a tender offer transaction 
 
These criteria yielded 1730 data points during the designated time period.  From this dataset, she 
identified MOEs using criteria established by the Securities Data Company (SDC): 
 
1. The two firms publicly announce the merger as an MOE 
2. The two firms have approximately the same pre-merger market capitalization 
3. The ownership of the new entity will be owned approximately 50/50 by each company’s 
shareholders 
4. Both companies should have approximately equal representation on the board of directors 
of the new company. 
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The SDC identified 53 MOEs during the time period of study, from which Wulf further 
narrowed the data down to 40 mergers she classified as MOEs [See Appendix A]. 
From these 40 MOEs, it was necessary to further clean the data for the purposes of this study.  
Because this study aimed to evaluate the long-term financial success of these MOEs, it was 
necessary that all MOE data points in the study had distinguishable financial records over the 
chosen period of examination, 10 years.1  Based on these criteria, 24 of the original 40 MOEs 
were eliminated from the dataset for the following reasons: 
 
1. 5 of the MOEs in Wulf’s original data set were never completed.  Some were blocked by 
government anti-trust regulations while others just did not reach an agreement deemed 
suitable by the parties involved. 
2. 17 of the MOEs later merged with other companies in such a way that the financial data 
of the original MOE became indistinguishable.2 
3. 2 of the MOEs ultimately failed as companies, either going bankrupt and ceasing to exist 
or being acquired by private equity firms for extensive restructuring. 
 
As such, 16 MOEs remained for the purposes of this study [See Appendix B].  
 
Collecting data on MOE characteristics 
After identifying the data points of study, I then obtained data regarding the leadership 
succession of each of the MOEs.  The factors of leadership succession that I identified for each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 10 years was chosen to maximize the evaluation of existing financial returns.  The last MOE in the original dataset occurred in 
2000, so a 10-year timeline ensured that all financial data would be available if the company’s financials were still retrievable. 
2 A general rule of thumb for eliminating data points on this criteria was whether or not the MOE was smaller than the company 
with which it was merging in the subsequent merger.  It can thus effectively be assumed that the original MOE was absorbed into 
another company and took on the identity of this new company or at least an identity that can no longer be reconciled with the 
original MOE.	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MOE were factors that I thought might have a notable relationship with later financial success of 
the merged company.  Initially, I hypothesized that the following characteristics of MOE 
leadership succession would be significantly linked with financial returns: 
 
Form of new leadership: Does the company employ co-CEOs after the MOE or does it 
transition directly to a single CEO?  The reasoning for this factor is that co-CEOs may allow for 
a smoother transition culturally; it is likely best received by employees because a co-CEOship 
most accurately reflects the composition of the firm at that time.  On the other hand, a co-CEO 
structure may compromise efficiency and agility that is also important for a successful post-
merger integration. 
 
New CEO retention: How long does the leader(s) installed as a result of the merger remain in 
post after the merger?  Depending on the nature of the merger, certain CEO appointments may 
simply be to ensure a smooth merger and therefore the individuals are replaced once the 
company has reached a steady state.  On the other hand, having a consistent CEO who sees the 
company through the merger and ensuing stability may lead to greater financial returns. 
 
Outcome of unsuccessful CEO: If there an unsuccessful CEO (i.e., a CEO from one of the 
original companies that is not chosen as CEO of the merged company), is this individual retained 
in another management position or released from the company?  If the individual is retained, this 
may serve to appease the half of the merged company that originally worked for this CEO, thus 
better fostering cultural integration.  However, if the leadership styles of the two CEOs vying for 
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the top spot are incompatible, the unsuccessful of the two may be a liability to the management 
team if retained. 
 
New CEO’s tenure in pre-merger company: Is the individual who is chosen as the new CEO a 
veteran of the company or someone brought on specifically for the merger? It is possible that 
internal support for a CEO is positively correlated with that individual’s tenure in the pre-merger 
company and subsequently reflected in financial returns.  For example, employees may vie 
harder for their CEO to be granted the top position if he or she is a veteran of the original 
company and therefore is seen to “deserve” it.  Additionally, according to Roberto Weber and 
Colin Camerer in their 2003 article for Management Science “Cultural Conflict and Merger 
Failure,” a more tenured leader might offer more organizational memory.  Remembering how 
culture was first established in the pre-merger company may allow such a leader to better 
oversee the cultural integration of the merged company (Weber).  On the other hand, company 
veterans, while well-versed on the operations of their original companies, may be too entrenched 
in traditional methodologies to successfully support a merger, especially an MOE. 
 
These were the four variables on which I initially chose to examine the 16 MOEs.  
However, over the course of collecting data, it became evident that additional variables could 
add valuable color to the study.  Specifically: 
 
If co-CEOs, intended resulting new CEO? As a subset of “Form of new leadership,” if co-
CEOs were employed as a post-merger strategy, did the company identify a clear succession plan 
between the co-CEOs?  While imperfect, if such a plan existed it was typically disclosed in 
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media coverage of the merger; a succession plan between co-CEOs might suggest that the 
company is likely to have taken other measures to facilitate post-merger integration and boost 
financial returns.   
 
If unsuccessful retained, hostile resignation? As a subset of “Outcome of Unsuccessful CEO,” 
if there was an unsuccessful CEO and that CEO was retained immediately after the merger, was 
there a later hostile resignation of this individual?  Similar to “If co-CEOs, intended resulting 
new CEO?,” this factor relied on media reports of such hostile resignations, which are imperfect 
given that hostile resignations may have been shielded from the public in the interests of 
preserving internal relations and public relations.  However, over the course of collecting data, 
the prevalence of public reporting on hostile resignations was such that it seemed appropriate to 
include this as an additional data point. 
 
Data for these factors were obtained from SEC filings, company issuances, and media 
coverage and these data were then translated into numerical values [See Appendix C].   
Of these initial findings, notably, the co-CEO form of leadership succession is relatively 
prevalent, with 6 of the 16 MOEs employing co-CEOs as a direct result of the merger.  Also, all 
but one of these 6 MOEs with co-CEOs had a publicized succession plan identifying which CEO 
was going to take on the full capacity of CEO within a designated time period.  The one MOE 
that did not have this such distinction was Citigroup; however, the company did transition to a 
single CEO structure two years after its merger, so it is possible company had such an 
established succession plan but just did not disclose it publicly.3  This seems to suggest that, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 As such, all MOEs employing a co-CEO structure do identify or later reveal which CEO is the “ultimate” CEO, which allows 
data collection for the other factors under question, in which the distinction of this “ultimate CEO” is necessary. 
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regardless of the actual financial returns connected with this tactic, the co-CEO leadership 
structure is favored for merger integration, yet companies do not view it as sustainable in the 
long term.  For all MOEs that used a co-CEO structure, the individual designated the “ultimate” 
CEO was assumed for data collection on other MOE factors to be the “new CEO” (i.e., these 
individuals were used to calculate “Length of New CEO retention” and “New CEO Tenure in 
pre-merger company, etc.). 
The data collected for “Length of new CEO retention” varies, with the shortest length of 
CEO retention post-merger being one year and the longest being 14 years.  The new CEO tenure 
in pre-merger company is similarly varied, with the shortest tenure being 1 year and the longest 
tenure being 22 years.  These variances may reflect the purposes of these individual CEOs for 
their companies: those with short tenure or short retention may have been brought on solely for 
the merger, while those with long tenure or long retention were meant as more permanent 
company figures.  Areas of further study might examine the correlation between these two 
factors. 
Finally, because all MOEs in the dataset that employed a co-CEO structure ultimately 
transitioned to a single CEO setup at some point after the merger, it was possible to identify an 
“unsuccessful CEO” for each MOE.  All but two of the 16 MOEs retained their unsuccessful 
CEOs, suggesting that this is a good strategy, whether for morale or public relations purposes.  
Notably, seven of these MOEs that retained their unsuccessful CEOs later experienced hostile 
resignations.  As mentioned before, this is an imperfect measure due to the subjectivity and 
selectivity of what is released to the media, but if anything this is likely an underestimation of the 
true number of hostile resignations. 
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Financial returns 
After assigning values to each of these leadership succession factors for the MOEs, I then 
obtained the corresponding financial data.  In order to evaluate the “financial success” of these 
firms, I used the market-adjusted return (MAR), in which the company’s returns are adjusted for 
the returns of the index: 
MARjt = Rjt – Rmt  
(Dennis and McConnell) 
For each MOE identified, I collected the monthly MAR over the course of ten years, 
starting from the month of the merger.  Controlling for year-specific factors, the MAR data was 
then correlated across the leadership succession factor values for each corresponding MOE. 
 
III. Findings 
The results yielded insignificant relationships between each of the leadership succession 
factors and the long-term financial returns of the MOEs.  The multivariate regression is as 
follows: 
 
MAR = -0.04 + 0.000137 * [Time] + 0.020265 * [co-CEOship] – 0.002127 * [If co-CEO, 
intended resulting new CEO?] + -0.000294 * [Length of new CEO retention] – 0.00551 * 
[Outcome of unsuccessful CEO] – 0.000808 * [If unsuccessful retained, Hostile Resignation?] – 
0 * [New CEO Tenure in pre-merger] + [Year dummy variables] 
 
Where: 
• MAR = market-adjusted return, monthly over 10 years 
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• Time = time period (1 month each) after merger 
• Co-CEOship = Form of new leadership, where 0 = single CEO and 1 = co-CEO 
• If co-CEO, intended resulting new CEO? = If Co-CEOs, intended resulting CEO? Where 
0 = no and 1 = yes 
• Length of New CEO retention = length of new CEO retention in merged company 
• Outcome of unsuccessful CEO = What is the outcome of the unsuccessful CEO? 0 = 
released, 1 = retained 
• If unsuccessful retained, Hostile Resignation? = If the unsuccessful CEO was retained, 
was there a hostile departure? Where 0 = no and 1 = yes 
• New CEO Tenure in pre-merger = new CEO tenure in pre-merger company 
• Year dummy variables = control for year-specific factors 
[See Appendix D] 
 
 These results seem to suggest that employing a co-CEO structure directly as a result of an 
MOE has the strongest relationship with post-merger financial success, as the positive coefficient 
of this variable has the largest magnitude of all the resulting variable coefficients; nonetheless, 
the relationship is not significant.   
 Retention practices of unsuccessful CEOs are next most noteworthy with respect to 
coefficient magnitude, though the results are still insignificant.  The output seems to indicate that 
retention of unsuccessful CEOs tend to be somewhat negatively correlated with financial 
success.  This might suggest that, in an MOE, it is better to simply release the unsuccessful CEO 
to better facilitate post-merger transition. 
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 Of the remaining output, surprisingly the presence of a succession plan in the event of a 
co-CEOship is negatively correlated with long-term financial returns, which contrasts with the 
initial hypothesis.  The Length of New CEO retention as well as New CEO Tenure in pre-merger 
company are also both slightly negative, which is not too surprising given the initial evaluation 
of the dataset in which values for both measures varied quite a bit across the different MOEs.   
 Finally, the coefficient for the Time variable was slightly positive, suggesting that, in 
general, financial returns for companies tend to improve with the passage of time.  Perhaps this 
indicates that the passage of time can undo many of the effects of leadership succession on MOE 
financial success.  
 
IV. Analysis of Findings and Further Research 
There are a number of reasons that might explain the insignificance of the results 
obtained from the multivariate regression, which spurred additional studies. 
 
Additional Study: Varying Time Periods 
First of all, the time series chosen for financial returns may have been too long.  It is 
possible that the impact of leadership succession characteristics on company financial success is 
limited to the few years after the merger, in which case including a full ten-year period may have 
diluted these distinguishable effects.   
Accordingly, an addendum to the study was conducted in which the regression was re-run 
over varying time periods to see if there is variance in short-term versus long-term results [See 
Appendix E].  The addendum ran the regression over abridged periods of 7 years, 5 years, and 
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then 3 years.  A table comparing the coefficients for each variable under the different time 
frames is below: 
Coefficient 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year 
Time 0.000683 0.000216 0.000301 0.000137 
co-CEO 0.032716 0.030294 0.025643 0.020265 
Intended resulting new CEO? -0.001691 -0.001732 -0.000001 -0.002127 
Length of new CEO retention 0.000239 -0.000159 -0.000208 -0.000294 
Outcome of Unsuccessful CEO -0.005753 -0.004909 -0.006572 -0.005510 
Hostile Resignation 0.009257 0.010285 0.002287 -0.000808 
New CEO Tenure in pre company 0.001556 0.000935 0.000362 -0.000041 
 
The dilution effect seems to be confirmed by the decrease in magnitude of the positive 
coefficient for Time; as the time period is lengthened, the passage of time is generally less 
strongly correlated with financial returns, though these coefficients are not statistically 
significant. 
The trend in the data seems to suggest that the effect of co-CEOship, Length of new CEO 
retention, and New CEO Tenure in pre-merger company on financial returns of the MOE 
decreases with the lengthening of the time period in question. In fact, the coefficient for “Length 
of new CEO retention” goes from positive to negative between the 3-year and 5-year time frames 
and the coefficient for “New CEO Tenure in pre-merger company” also does so from the 7-year 
to 10-year output. It is possible that the financial returns associated with “New CEO Tenure in 
pre-merger company” decreases with the time frame because the longer a very tenured CEO 
stays with a company post-MOE, the less they are able to turn out financial returns.  For 
example, a CEO that has a long tenure in the company might be good from transition purposes 
but by 10 years after the merger, their expertise in merger integration is no longer salient and in 
fact their tenure might make them less inclined to initiate necessary and beneficial changes to the 
company, causing financial returns to taper off with time.  In a similar way, the fact that the 
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coefficient for “Length of new CEO Retention” goes from positive to negative within 3-5 years 
suggests that, within this timeframe, the length of a CEO’s retention post-merger peaks, after 
which companies that refresh their CEO position experience higher financial returns.  This might 
be due to increased creativity and innovation of a new CEO and willingness to try new methods 
or perhaps the age of the CEO becomes important.  The effect of co-CEOs remains positive 
across all the timeframes measured but decreases in magnitude; this suggests that the existence 
of co-CEOs post-MOE is generally associated with positive financial returns but whatever is the 
effect of initial co-CEOship on financial returns is diluted with time and other factors become 
more salient in boosting company performance.  Nonetheless, even under the three year output, 
none of these coefficients register as statistically significant. 
With regards to the other variables, the coefficient for existence of a succession plan 
under a co-CEO structure is negative and its magnitude generally increases with the passage of 
time.  This might indicate that, along with the existence of such a plan come some other merger 
integration facilitators that manifest their effects in the longer-term, such as other succession and 
integration planning.  The magnitude of the coefficient for retention of unsuccessful CEO 
fluctuates with the time periods and does not display a meaningful pattern, but it is negative 
across all time periods suggesting that retention of unsuccessful CEOs is correlated with lower 
financial returns.  This is surprising, as many firms choose to retain their unsuccessful CEOs 
post-merger, likely for employee morale purposes.  It is possible that such retention 
compromises the merger integration process, as it confounds or complicates the adoption of a 
post-merger culture.  In contrast, the coefficient for hostile resignation of unsuccessful CEO is 
positive and increases when the time period shifts from 3 years to 5 years, but then decreases in 
longer time periods and even becomes negative under a 10- year period.  This finding is also 
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surprising; it is possible that a hostile resignation increases higher financial returns in the short 
run by providing a clear statement on the leadership – and corresponding cultural – direction of 
the company.  However, in the long term, a hostile resignation might be an indicator of less 
desirable working conditions imposed by management in a way that is ultimately detrimental to 
financial performance.  As before, the coefficients for these variables under varying time periods 
are not statistically significant. 
 
Additional study: Event Study 
An even more extreme form of truncating the timeframe of MOE returns is through an 
event study.  Event studies determine the effect of an event on the value of the firm, which is 
assumed to be reflected in daily stock returns in a short time period directly after the event, 
usually a matter of days.  In this event study, the event is the MOE and the date (t =  0) is the 
date the merger was formally announced.  The impact of the event, then, is measured by the 
abnormal returns of the firm’s security over a designated time window.  Abnormal returns were 
measured for both pre-merger companies of an MOE.  The event window that I used was 20 days 
prior and 20 days post the MOE announcement date. 
 
In an event study, abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
ARiT= RiT – E(RiT | XT) 
(MacKinlay) 
Where: 
ARiT = Abnormal returns for firm “i” on event date “T” 
RiT = Actual returns for firm “i” on event date “T” 
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E(RiT | XT) = Normal return for firm “i” over the event window period 
This normal return [E(RiT | XT)] can be calculated using either the constant mean return 
model or the market model (MacKinlay).  In running event studies for the MOE data, I used both 
the constant mean return model and the market model.  In the constant mean return model, the 
“normal return” was the average of the security’s returns in the period [-100, -21].  In the market 
model, the “normal return” was based off a linear relationship between the S&P500 Returns and 
the security’s returns in the period [-100, -21].  I was able to compare the actual returns of the 
securities over the event window to these projected “normal returns” and thus calculate 
“abnormal returns.” 
After calculating the abnormal returns for each security over the time window under the 
two methodologies, I examined the data in two ways.   
First, I determined if the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the securities were 
significant over varying time periods [-1, 1], [-3, 3], [-5, 5], [-10, 10], [-20, 20].  The output is as 
follows: 
Constant Mean Return Model 
 
Market Model 
  CAR [-1,1] CAR[-3,3] CAR [-5,5] CAR [-10, 10] CAR [-20,20] 
Average CAR 0.041932 0.041557 0.027742 0.007439 0.004036 
Std. Dev. CAR 0.082953 0.086556 0.069942 0.096314 0.120239 
t-stat 0.505495 0.480117 0.39665 0.077234 0.03357 
 
 
CAR [-1,1] CAR[-3,3] CAR [-5,5] CAR [-10, 10] CAR [-20,20] 
Average CAR 0.04095 0.035242 0.022181 0.00013 -0.00104 
Std. Dev. CAR 0.075212 0.082479 0.070855 0.102815 0.124805 
t-stat 0.544464 0.427281 0.31304 0.001265 -0.00831 
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 The two models yielded similar results.  Under both models, the Average CAR is positive 
under all the time periods except to [-20, 20] time frame on the constant mean return model.  In 
both models, the CAR also decreased with the expansion of the event window, as is expected – 
abnormal returns are expected to be greatest immediately around the event date.  Nevertheless, 
none of the average CAR values are statistically significant.  This is surprising because the 
announcement of a merger typically has a significant positive effect on stock returns.  Possible 
reasons why the CAR measures for these MOEs are not statistically significant is because of the 
limited dataset, lack of public confidence specifically in mergers of equals that is then reflected 
in lukewarm stock price increases, or selection of time period for determining expected normal 
returns under both the Constant Mean Return Model and the Market Model.  
 Second, I regressed the Constant Mean Return Model CARs of time periods [-1,1], [-3,3], 
and [-5,5] against the characteristics of MOE leadership succession for each of the pre-MOE 
companies examined in the original study4 [See Appendix F].  The output is as follows: 
CAR 
interval 
Form of new 
Leadership 
CEO 
Succession 
Plan 
Unsuccessful 
CEO 
New CEO 
Tenure in Pre-
Merger 
Company 
[-1,1] 0.12399994* -0.137543* -0.055697 -0.002105 
[-3,3] 0.1206418* -0.159398* -0.050039 -0.000953 
[-5,5] 0.1154511* -0.135041* -0.048355 -0.001544 
*statistically significant    
  
 In the short term, the public seems to have confidence in the presence of a co-CEO 
structure, as the coefficient for “Form of new leadership” is positively correlated with financial 
returns across all three CAR intervals, and these measures are statistically significant.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The “New CEO Retention” variable was omitted in the event study; while it is applicable for the original 
study, this information – how long the “new CEO” stays in position post-merger, is not known to 
anybody at the time of the merger and is also unpredictable.  Thus, this variable cannot reasonably have 
an effect on abnormal returns.  The “Hostile Resignation” variable was omitted for this same reason. 
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 20 	  
Announcement of a CEO succession plan along with the merger is, surprisingly, negatively 
correlated with the short-term CARs, and these measures are also statistically significant.  
Perhaps this reflects skepticism in the chosen CEO successors rather than the presence of a 
succession plan itself. 
The coefficients for “Unsuccessful CEO” and “New CEO Tenure in Pre-Merger 
Company” are not statistically significant.  Interestingly, retention of the unsuccessful CEO is 
not correlated with higher financial returns right at the outset of the merger announcement.  
Perhaps the public does not favor retention of the unsuccessful CEO due to concerns of this 
retention hindering cultural integration or similar concerns in choice of successful versus 
unsuccessful CEO. This disfavor decreases slightly with longer CAR intervals, but these 
correlations are not statistically significant.  The correlation between New CEO Tenure in Pre-
Merger company and short-term financial returns is very close to zero but slightly negative; they 
do not show a consistent pattern over across the CAR intervals.  This might reflect the great 
variance in tenure values in the dataset. 
 
Additional Study: Inclusion of Previously Omitted MOEs 
A third weakness of the original study is that the original dataset is likely skewed.  
Because the original dataset of 40 MOEs had been narrowed down to 16 that had 10-year 
financial data, the resulting data points are effectively biased in that they are the ones that 
“survived” and succeeded.  Thus, these MOEs are likely more high-performing, which 
confounds the distinction between the financial returns.   
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As such, an addition to the study revisited the original 40 MOEs and incorporated MOEs 
that had previously been omitted from the original study on the following grounds: 
 
• The MOE was later absorbed by another company through a merger/acquisition in 
such a way that the original MOE lost its identity and could not be distinguished from 
the newly merged company 
• The MOE ultimately failed and ceased to exist as a company 
 
19 MOEs from the original 40 fell under either of these two categories.  The additional 
study, then, incorporated the 16 MOEs that succeeded as well as the 19 MOEs that, within a 10-
year period, disappeared.  Of the original 40, 5 MOEs were never consummated, so they 
continued to remain omitted from the dataset. 
 In compiling data for this additional study, it became evident that the variables of study 
needed to be revised from the original set.  The variables – applied to both the original 16 MOEs 
and the previously omitted 19 MOEs – are as follows: 
 
Control variables for Fate of the MOE: “Absorbed,” “Failed” or “Succeeded” where each 
variable could take on values of either “0” or “1” and [Absorbed + Failed + Succeeded = 1] for 
each MOE.  The 16 MOEs from the original study were all categorized as “Succeeded,” and of 
the 19 previously omitted MOEs, 17 were “Absorbed” into subsequent mergers while 2 “Failed” 
(Cendant and Friede Goldman Halter) either through bankruptcy or acquisition by a Private 
Equity firm. 
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CEO Type: “CEO[co]”, “CEO[only]”, “CEO[A]”, “CEO[B]” where the original study only 
accounted for two forms of CEO structure: single CEO vs. co-CEO.  Inclusion of the previously 
omitted 19 MOEs also introduced a greater variety of CEO structures as well as a more accurate 
methodology of accounting for CEO succession.  “CEO[co]” denotes a co-CEO structure, which 
eventually would lead to a single CEO structure.  “CEO[only]” is when there is only a single 
CEO resulting from the merger and this position is not associated with a succession plan; for the 
purposes of the merger, this individual is the “only CEO” associated.  “CEO[A]” and “CEO[B],” 
then, allow for a more robust examination of CEO succession.  Specifically, “CEO[A]” would be 
the first leader of an MOE after its execution but is always succeeded by another CEO associated 
with the merger; in most cases, this is through a clear succession plan.  “CEO[B]” is the second 
leader after the execution of the MOE; it can follow either “CEO[A]” or “CEO[co]” where in 
“CEO[co]” there is not one designated CEO but there still exists some leader before “CEO[B]” 
ascends to the position.  Under this methodology, it is possible for an MOE to have values for the 
following pairs: “CEO[A]” and “CEO[B],” “CEO[co]” and “CEO[B].”  However, it is not 
possible to have values for both “CEO[co]” and “CEO[A],” nor is it possible to have a value for 
“CEO[only]” with any other CEO Type variable.   
Whereas previous methodology typically counted “CEO[B]” as the new CEO and 
ignored “CEO[A],” many of the previously omitted 19 MOEs exist on shorter timeline than the 
16 original MOEs due to subsequent mergers of company failures; as such, even though 
“CEO[B]” may still be the CEO intended to have a greater effect post-merger, many MOEs in 
the revised dataset never have their “CEO[B]”s ascend, and so incorporation of “CEO[A]” data 
is necessary and appropriate.  This revised methodology is better able to account for the variety 
of succession patterns across the MOE data points. 
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 In the event of a transition, either from {CEO[co]  CEO[B]} or {CEO[A]  CEO[B]}, 
values [0,1] for the respective CEO Type were matched to the years that structure was in place to 
best match the CEO Type (co, only, A, B) to corresponding financial returns.  There were a few 
cases – particularly in the previously omitted 19 MOEs – where a CEO[B] is identified through a 
succession plan but the company is either absorbed or fails before the transition is able to occur.  
The methodology is not altered for such cases – as a result, for such MOEs, only CEO[A] of the 
CEO Types will have values for the duration of the MOE. 
 
Succession Plan: where [0] = no and [1] = yes.  This is slightly revised from the original 
methodology in that the original only accounted for a succession plan given a co-CEO structure.  
The revised methodology accounts for any sort of succession plan – whether for a co-CEO 
structure or a singular pre-established {CEO[A]  CEO[B]} transition.   Note that the presence 
of a succession plan was considered independently of how well the company followed this pre-
established plan; many times, companies would plan for a transition from {CEO[A]CEO[B]} 
in “X” number of years but make the transition either earlier or later than planned.  The true 
timing of the transition is reflected in the values for the CEO Type, but this particular variable 
focuses solely on the presence of a succession plan at the time of the MOE.  Similarly to the 
original study, the values retrieved for this variable might be slightly skewed given not every 
MOE that has a succession plan may publicize it, but publicizing of succession plans was 
prevalent enough to include it as a variable of interest. 
 
Retention of CEO: “CEO[only] Retention,” “CEO[A] Retention,” and “CEO[B] Retention” to 
best match the retention values to the CEO Type.  If the CEO Type for the MOE is CEO[only], 
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then only “CEO[only] Retention” will have values reflecting how long this CEO was retained in 
the post-merger MOE.  For MOEs of the previously omitted 19 that were later absorbed by other 
mergers, the “CEO[only] Retention” is truncated with the subsequent merger, even if the 
CEO[only] retains a leadership position in the new, post-MOE company.  This is in order to 
maintain consistency between the values for this variable with the MOE financial returns.  If 
there is both a CEO[A] and CEO[B], the Retention values for each time period of an MOE are 
matched with the concurrent CEO. 
 
Tenure of CEO: “CEO[only] Tenure,” “CEO[A] Tenure,” “CEO[B] Tenure,” with the same 
methodology as described for the “Retention of CEO” variable.  “Tenure” is counted specifically 
for leadership positions in the pre-merger company – instead of total tenure, which for some 
CEOs can be decades.  This is to maintain consistency and meaningful values across this 
variable. 
 
Outcome of unsuccessful CEO? [0] = released and [1] = retained; the unsuccessful CEO is the 
other frontrunner CEO that is not chosen as the “New CEO.”  In a transition from {CEO[co]  
CEO[B]}, CEO[A] would be the “unsuccessful CEO.”  In a succession where {CEO[A]  
CEO[B]}, CEO[B] is considered the “unsuccessful CEO” because this individual does not first 
obtain the position.   
 
Hostile resignation? Same methodology as original study. 
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 This additional study yielded interesting results [See Appendix G].  The output yields two 
statistically significant variable coefficients, the first being that MOEs absorbed by subsequent 
mergers have performance 1.1% higher than MOEs that ultimately succeeded – namely, the 
original 16 MOEs.  Not surprisingly, MOEs that failed have performance 0.1% lower than 
MOEs that succeeded, though this measure is not statistically significant.  
 To further explore the coefficients for the Fate of MOE variables (“Absorbed,” “Failed,” 
and “Succeeded”), the additional study was re-run aggregating “Absorbed and Failed” into a 
“Did not Succeed” category, which was Zeroed out in the regression output against the 
“Succeeded” variable in order to get a value for “Succeeded” [See Appendix H].  The 
aggregation of these two variables might have provided a more accurate regression, given the 
“Failed” variable in the original additional study only had two data points, giving them undue 
weight in the ultimate output.  In the results, companies that succeeded have financial returns 
that are 0.8% lower than firms that fell into the “Did not Succeed” category, and this measure 
was statistically significant.  This might be explained by cultural integration difficulties; in 
Weber, et. al’s experiment simulating the effect of merger integration on post-merger 
performance, the experiment found that “the merged group” – serving as a proxy for a merged 
company – “is (on average) never able to complete the task in this [pre-merger] amount of time 
or less in any of the 10 postmerger rounds” (11).  Thus, post-merger productivity is 
compromised due to difficulties involved with – or simply the process of  - cultural integration; 
this output is likely reflecting that finding.  Another possible reason for this finding is that the 
“Did not succeed” variable is being regressed only across returns of firms before their 
subsequent mergers or failures, many of which happened within just a few years of the original 
MOE.  In contrast, the data points of the “Succeeded category” include the full set of financial 
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returns for the MOE for 10 years post-merger.  By truncating the “Did not succeed” financial 
returns, it is difficult to accurately compare them to the full financial returns of the firms that 
“Succeeded.”  A possible additional study would compare these firms over the course of a 
standardized post-merger timeframe and see if firms that ultimately “Did not succeed” still have 
statistically significant higher returns than firms that “Succeeded” across this standardized time 
period. 
 In re-running the Additional Study with the aggregation of the “Did not Succeed” 
variables, the coefficients for the other variables shifted slightly, as is reasonable in finding a 
regression of best fit amongst multiple variables [See Appendix I].  One change to note is that of 
the Succession Plan; the coefficient for the disaggregated “Fate of MOE” was positive, but when 
the variables were aggregated the coefficient became negative, signifying a 800% decrease in 
coefficient value.  The reason for this drastic change in coefficient is unclear, but it may suggest 
that the two mergers in the “Failed” category in the study with the disaggregated “Fates” were 
driving the original coefficient.  Especially since the two failed mergers – Cendant and Friede 
Goldman Halter, both of which went bankrupt - had higher financial returns and both also had 
Succession Plans, the disaggregation of these points in the regression may have inflated the 
“Succession Plan” coefficient. 
 In considering why the “Absorbed” variable has a statistically significant positive 
coefficient in the first Additional Study (disaggregated “Fate of MOE” variables), it is possible 
that the financial returns are not positive because the company was later absorbed by a 
subsequent merger but rather the reverse: that the MOE’s higher financial returns in the short 
period post-merger made these companies more attractive for subsequent acquisition.   
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 The other coefficient that is statistically significant in the first Additional Study 
(disaggregated “Fate of MOE” variables) is that of the presence of a CEO[A].  Under the 
methodology, the presence of a CEO[A] is only possible when there is a clear succession plan 
from one CEO to another but specifically without the structure of a co-CEOship. Having a 
CEO[A] is associated by lower financial returns by 2.8%; having co-CEOs is associated with 
lower financial returns by 1.2% and have a single CEO through the merger (“CEO[only]”) is 
associated with lower financial returns by 0.5%, though the latter two measures are not 
statistically significant.  This might suggest that having a stable CEO or even a co-CEO structure 
is associated with higher financial returns than a succession plan between individual CEOs. 
 A possible reason why the presence of CEO[A] might have a statistically significant 
relationship with financial returns can be traced to its implications for cultural integration, which, 
as mentioned earlier, has been cited by industry literature as a significant but difficult to measure 
culprit for merger failure.  In every instance that a company from the MOE dataset had a 
CEO[A], the succeeding CEO[B] was from the other pre-merger company.  The underlying 
reasons for such a succession format might have been to protect employee morale, as giving both 
CEOs their time at the top spot might strike employees as more “fair,” even if their respective 
CEO retains that position for just a short period of time.  However, it is true that CEO 
personalities often reflect the culture of their original companies; if, every time there exists a 
CEO[A] and that CEO[A] transitions to a CEO[B] from a different company, that can be likened 
to the MOE going from culture[A] to culture [B].  Under the reasonable assumption that even 
culturally compatible companies must have some differences, a {CEO[A]CEO[B]} succession 
must lead to an extended and more complex cultural integration – potentially even more so than 
under a co-CEO structure.  As cited in Weber’s study, a McKinsey recommendation for merging 
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companies suggested that the newly merged group or company work on a new task together 
instead of trying to merge two existing methods for tasks familiar to both pre-merger companies 
(15).  In a similar way, starting off the post-merger period with a co-CEO structure forces the 
new firm to merge the two cultures from the outset; in contrast, a {CEO[A]  CEO[B]} 
transition perpetuates the pre-existing culture of whichever CEO holds the position at that time, 
which is then imposed upon the merged company.   
 CEO[B] does not have the same issues as does CEO[A] because a CEO[B] can arise from 
two different scenarios – succeeding a CEO[A] or succeeding a co-CEOship - and the effect of a 
CEO[B] under each of the two scenarios cannot be disaggregated in this data. 
 Interestingly, while the presence of CEO[A] has a statistically significant detrimental 
effect to financial returns, longer retention of CEO[A] in the position is associated with higher 
financial returns, though this finding is not significant.  This is in contrast with the original study, 
in which longer Retention of the “new CEO” was associated with lower financial returns.  
Longer retention of CEO[only] and CEO[B] have results in line with the original study, though 
these findings are also not statistically significant. 
 In contrast with the original study, the retention of the unsuccessful CEO as well as the 
prevalence of a hostile resignation are positively associated with financial returns, though not 
statistically significant; the first of these findings is in line with the original hypothesis, but the 
second is not. 
 Finally, similar to the original study, measures of CEO tenure in pre-merger company 
seem to have negligible effects on financial returns, as these variables have coefficients close to 
zero and are not statistically significant. 
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In light of the results from the additional studies, there are a few other reasons that 
might explain why the original study did not yield significant results.  First of all, there are too 
few data points to draw any significant conclusions.  This is due to the fact that MOEs, as they 
are defined, are quite rare.  Even extending the initial timeframe over which I compiled MOEs 
that occurred – say, from one decade to two – would not yield enough data points to make the 
outcome significantly more meaningful.  Additionally, extending the timeframe would 
incorporate additional concerns regarding stationarity of the data and the changing landscape of 
M&As over such a broad time period.  This weakness of the study hinges upon the content of the 
study itself. 
The lack of data points also makes it more difficult to identify outlier data points.  The 
variables “New CEO Retention” and “Tenure in pre-merger company” are particularly 
susceptible to outliers, as they measure number of years a CEO has this relationship with the 
company.  The range of values for “New CEO Retention” go from 1 year to 14 years; the 
average value is 6.3 years with a standard deviation of 4.06 years, which is quite varied.  “Tenure 
in pre-merger company” is similarly volatile; the range is 1-22 years, and the average tenure is 
9.8 years with a standard deviation of 7 years.  Because there are a number of different factors 
that may affect the values for these variables and they vary so widely amongst so few data 
points, it is difficult to find a meaningful correlation between these measures and company 
financial returns. 
Multicollinearity amongst the variables chosen for the original study may also have 
contributed to the insignificant output values.  For example, the decision to retain the 
unsuccessful CEO might be related to the presence of a co-CEOship after the MOE.  It is also 
possible that Length of New CEO Retention is related to the New CEO’s tenure in pre-merger 
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company, as mentioned earlier.  If such relationships do exist, including multiple related 
variables will simply diminish each of their incremental effects on the financial returns in the 
multivariate regression, rendering them all insignificant.  Additional studies would examine the 
choice in variables and their relationship to one another to decrease the instances of 
multicollinearity. 
Finally, it is possible that there is just not a significant relation between leadership 
succession and financial success of firms, as per the stance proposed by Organizational Ecology.  
If this is true, then it has important implications for mergers: the choice of leadership succession 
is not important in how the merged company fares thereafter, even in such an extreme case as an 
MOE.  Nonetheless, the high failure rate of mergers remains, and so research should shift 
attention to other salient factors such as cultural and operational integration to identify and 
address the main challenges facing mergers today.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 31 	  
Works cited: 
 
Allred, Brent B. et. al.  “Corporations as Stepfamilies: A New Metaphor for Explaining the Fate 
of Merged and Acquired Companies.”  The Academy of Management Executive 19:3 
(2005).  23-37. 
 
Cartwright, Susan and Richard Schoenberg.  “Thirty Years of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Research: Recent Advances and Future Opportunities.”  British Journal of Management 
17 (2006): S1-5. 
 
Dennis, Debra K. and John J. McConnell.  “Corporate Mergers and Security Returns.”  Journal 
of Financial Economics 16 (1986): 143-187. 
 
Drori, Israel, et. al.  “Cultural Clashes in a ‘Merger of Equals’: The Case of High-Tech Start-
ups.”  Human Resource Management 50:5 (2011): 625-649. 
 
Heijltjes, Marielle G. and Hanneke S. ter Velde.  “Leadership in a post-merger context: The 
importance of people skills over politics.”  Maastricht University. 
 
MacKinlay, Archie Craig.  “Event Studies in Economics and Finance.”  Journal of Economic 
Literature 35: 1 (1997): 13-39. 
 
Siehl, Caren, et. al.  “After the merger: should executives stay or go?”  Academy of Management 
Executive 4:1 (1990): 50-60. 
 
Weber, Roberto A. and Colin F. Camerer.  “Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An 
Experimental Approach.”  Management Science 49:4 (2003).  400-415. 
 
Wulf, Julie.  “Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from ‘Mergers of 
Equals.’”  The Wharton School (2001). 
 
 
Additional works consulted: 
 
Harding, David and Sam Rovit.  Mastering the Merger: Four Critical Decisions That Make or 
Break the Deal.  Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2004. 
 
Moeller, Scott.  “2011 M&A Forecast.”  Intelligent Mergers.  3 Jan 2011. 
http://intelligentmergers.com.  
 
Prorok, Philip.  “A Merger of Equals?  An Analysis of the Ticketmaster-Live Nation Merger.” 
Chicago-Kent College of Law (2009). 
 
“The Return of the Merger of Equals.”  Dealbook, The New York Times.  17 Feb 2009. 
 
 
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 32 	  
Appendix A: 40 MOEs identified from 2001 Wulf study 
 
Company 1 Company 2 Year merged 
Bell Atlantic Corp. GTE Corp. 2000 
Travelers Group Citicorp 1998 
NBD Bancorp, Inc. First Chicago Corp. 1995 
PECO Energy Co. Unicom Corp. 2000 
NationsBank Corp. BankAmerica Corp. 1998 
Nevada Power Co. Sierra Pacific Resources 1999 
First Security Financial Corp. Omni Capital Group 1992 
Staples, inc.  Office Depot, Inc. Not completed 
Wisconsin Energy Corp. Northern States Power Co. Not completed 
Indiana Energy, Inc. SIGCORP, Inc. 2000 
Chateau Properties ROC Communities 1997 
Premier Bancshares, inc. Central & Southern Holding Co. 1997 
Pinnacle Financial Services Indiana Federal Corp. 1997 
Ocean Energy, Inc. United Meridian Corporation 1998 
Society Corp KeyCorp 1994 
Associated BancCorp First Financial Corporation 1997 
ASARCO Incorporated Cyprus Amax Minerals Company Not completed 
CapStar Hotel Co. American General Hospitality Corp. 1998 
Charter One Financial, Inc. FirstFed Michigan Corporation 1995 
LG&E Energy Corp. KU Energy Corp 1998 
Bell Atlantic Corp. NYNEX Corp. 1997 
BB&T Financial Corp. Southern National Co. 1995 
CUC International Inc. HFS, Inc. 1997 
Chemical Banking Corp. Chase Manhattan Corp. 1996 
FCB Financial Corp. OSB Financial Corp. 1997 
Falcon Drilling Company, Inc. Reading & Bates Corporation 1997 
Durco International Inc. BW/IP, Inc. 1997 
Promus Hotel Corp. Doubletree Corp. 1997 
Hinsdale Financial Corp. Liberty Bancorp, Inc. 1997 
Foundation Health Corp. Health Systems International, Inc. 1997 
Friede Goldman International, 
Inc. Halter Marine Group, Inc. 1999 
Fred Meyer, Inc. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. 1997 
MindSpring Enterprises, Inc. EarthLink Network, Inc. 2000 
Martin Marietta Corp. Lockheed Corp. 1995 
Little Falls Bancorp, Inc. Skylands Community Bank Not completed 
UtiliCorp United Inc. Kansas City Power & Light Co. Not completed 
Commercial Bancorp West Coast Bancorp 1995 
Westinghouse Air Brake 
Company MotivePower Industries, Inc. 1999 
Dean Witter, Discover & Co. Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. 1997 
Monsanto Co. Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc. 2000 
 
 
Source: Wulf 
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Appendix B: 16 MOEs remaining for this study 
 
 
Company 1 Company 2 
Year 
merged New Company Name 
Stock 
Ticker 
Bell Atlantic Corp. GTE Corp. 2000 
Verizon 
Communications, Inc. VZ 
Travelers Group Citicorp 1998 Citigroup Inc. C 
PECO Energy Co. Unicom Corp. 2000 Exelon Corporation EXC 
NationsBank Corp. BankAmerica Corp. 1998 Bank of America BAC 
Nevada Power Co. Sierra Pacific Resources 1999 NV Energy NVE 
Indiana Energy, Inc. SIGCORP, Inc. 2000 Vectren Corp. VVC 
Society Corp KeyCorp 1994 KeyCorp KEY 
Associated BancCorp 
First Financial 
Corporation 1997 Associated Banc-Corp ASBC 
CapStar Hotel Co. 
American General 
Hospitality Corp. 1998 MeriStar Hospitality MHX 
BB&T Financial Corp. Southern National Co. 1995 BB&T BBT 
Durco International Inc. BW/IP, Inc. 1997 Flowserve FLS 
Foundation Health Corp. 
Health Systems 
International, Inc. 1997 
Foundation Health 
Systems HNT 
MindSpring Enterprises, 
Inc. EarthLink Network, Inc. 2000 Earthlink ELNK 
Martin Marietta Corp. Lockheed Corp. 1995 Lockheed Martin LMT 
Commercial Bancorp West Coast Bancorp 1995 West Coast Bank WCBO 
Westinghouse Air Brake 
Company 
MotivePower Industries, 
Inc. 1999 
Westinghouse Air Brake 
Technologies 
Corporation; Wabtec 
Corporation WAB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 34 	  
Appendix C: Data on leadership succession factors for 16 MOEs 
 
Company 1 Company 2 
Year 
merged New Company Name 
Stock 
Ticker 
Form of 
new 
leadersh
ip (0 = 
single 
CEO, 1 
= co-
CEO) 
If co-
CEO [1], 
clear 
successio
n plan? 
(0 = no, 
1 = yes) 
Length 
of new 
CEO 
retentio
n  
Outcome of 
Unsuccessful 
CEO     (0 = 
released, 1 = 
retained) 
If 
Unsuccessful 
CEO 
retained [1], 
Hostile 
Resignation? 
(0 = no, 1 = 
yes) 
New 
CEO 
Tenure 
in pre-
merger 
compan
y 
Bell Atlantic 
Corp. GTE Corp. 2000 
Verizon 
Communications, Inc. VZ 1 1 11 1 0 9 
Travelers 
Group Citicorp 1998 Citigroup Inc. C 1 0 8 1 1 12 
PECO Energy 
Co. Unicom Corp. 2000 Exelon Corporation EXC 1 1 12 1 0 2 
NationsBank 
Corp. 
BankAmerica 
Corp. 1998 Bank of America BAC 1 1 3 1 1 15 
Nevada 
Power Co. 
Sierra Pacific 
Resources 1999 NV Energy NVE 0 - 1 1 1 1 
Indiana 
Energy, Inc. 
SIGCORP, 
Inc. 2000 Vectren Corp. VVC 0 - 10 1 0 20 
Society Corp KeyCorp 1994 KeyCorp KEY 1 1 7 1 0 9 
Associated 
BancCorp 
First Financial 
Corporation 1997 Associated Banc-Corp ASBC 0 - 3 1 0 22 
CapStar Hotel 
Co. 
American 
General 
Hospitality 
Corp. 1998 MeriStar Hospitality MHX 0 - 8 1 0 20 
BB&T 
Financial 
Corp. 
Southern 
National Co. 1995 BB&T BBT 0 - 14 0 0 17 
Durco 
International 
Inc. BW/IP, Inc. 1997 Flowserve FLS 0 - 3 1 1 2 
Foundation 
Health Corp. 
Health 
Systems 
International, 
Inc. 1997 
Foundation Health 
Systems HNT 0 - 1 1 1 4 
MindSpring 
Enterprises, 
Inc. 
EarthLink 
Network, Inc. 2000 Earthlink ELNK 0 - 7 1 1 4 
Martin 
Marietta 
Corp. 
Lockheed 
Corp. 1995 Lockheed Martin LMT 1 1 2 1 0 8 
Commercial 
Bancorp 
West Coast 
Bancorp 1995 West Coast Bank WCBO 0 - 4 1 1 3 
Westinghouse 
Air Brake 
Company 
MotivePower 
Industries, 
Inc. 1999 
Westinghouse Air 
Brake Technologies 
Corporation (Wabtec 
Corporation) WAB 0 - 7 0 0 9 
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Appendix D: Multivariate Regression Output on 16 MOEs 
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Appendix E: Additional Study – Varying Time Periods, Multivariate Regression output 
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5-year Financial Returns 
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7-year Financial Returns 
Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 39 	  
Appendix F: Additional Study – Event Study, Multivariate Regression Output 
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Appendix G: Additional Study – Inclusion of Previously Omitted MOEs, Multivariate 
Regression Output 
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Appendix H: Re-Run Additional Study – Inclusion of Previously Omitted MOEs, 
Multivariate Regression Output with aggregated “Absorbed” and “Failed” variables 
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Appendix I: Additional Study – comparison table of output from Disaggregated and 
Aggregated “Fate of CEO” variables: “Absorbed,” “Failed,” and “Succeeded” 
 
 
Disaggregated Fate 
of MOE variables 
Aggregated Fate 
of MOE variables 
Time -0.000036 -0.00003318 
Did not Succeed 
Not included in 
study (Zeroed) 
Absorbed 0.0110834* 
Not included in 
study 
Failed 0.001111 
Not included in 
study 
Succeeded (Zeroed) -0.008416* 
CEO (co) -0.012016 -0.013625 
CEO(only -0.005893 -0.007529 
Succession Plan 0.0002827 -0.002266 
CEO(A) -0.028241* -0.030845* 
CEO(B) (Zeroed) (Zeroed) 
CEO(only) Retention -0.000192 -0.000131 
CEO(A) Retention 0.0014847 0.0015277* 
CEO(B) Retention -0.000414 -0.000637 
Outcome of 
unsuccessful? 0.0009084 0.0019252 
Hostile Resignation? 0.0010603 -0.000003056 
CEO(only) Tenure 0.000067944 5.8145E-07 
CEO(A) Tenure 0.0002277 0.0003413 
CEO(B) Tenure -0.000326 -0.000382 
 
 
 
 
 
